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Abstract
The nature and scope of various impossibility proofs as they re-
late to real-world situations are discussed. In particular, it is shown
in words without technical symbols how secure quantum bit commit-
ment protocols may be obtained with testing that exploits the multiple
possibilities of cheating entanglement formation.
1 Introduction
In this paper I would like to discuss the general issue of the scope of “impos-
sibility proof” of various different kinds, ranging from the classical straight-
edge/compass construction to hidden-variables and bit commitment in quan-
tum physics. The aim is to highlight the difficulties in characterizing all the
possibilities that can be obtained in principle in the real world, which are pur-
portedly ruled out by the impossibility proofs. The issue is of fundamental
significance for understanding the relation between real world features and
their mathematical representations, a subject of great importance and sub-
tlety in general. More specifically, I would also point out the non-existence
of a universal quantum bit commitment (QBC) impossibility proof. The
∗yuen@eecs.northwestern.edu
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presumed existence of such a proof is widely held, which sociologically and
psychologically closes out a field that is rare in the area of quantum informa-
tion in its potentially significant and realistic applications. A new way for
obtaining secure QBC protocols would also be indicated.
2 Five Cases of Impossibility Claims
Consider the following list of impossibility (non-existence) claims, in chrono-
logical order of their first appearance, which are supported by “proofs” of
various sorts to be analyzed.
(i) No Trisection of an Arbitrary Angle with Straight Edge and Compass:
It is not possible to construct in a finite number of steps an angle
equal to one-third of an arbitrarily given angle using only a compass
and an unmarked straight edge.
(ii) Church-Turing Thesis:
It is not possible to find a mechanical procedure that cannot be im-
plemented by a Turing machine.
(iii) No-Hidden Variable Theorem of von Neumann:
There is no hidden variable theory that would reproduce the predic-
tions of quantum mechanics.
(iv) No-Clone Theorem:
There is no physical system that would produce at the output two
identical copies of an input quantum state drawn from a set of two
nonorthogonal states.
(v) Impossibility of Quantum Bit Commitment:
There is no QBC protocol that is arbitrarily close to being perfectly
secure for both parties.
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What is remarkable about an impossibility theorem of the above variety is
that it rules out not just mathematical possibilities but physical realistic ones.
This implies that all the relevant physical possibilities in the real world for the
problem situation under consideration have been taken into account in the
mathematical formulation. Even given a physical theory describing the real
world such as quantum physics, this may or may not be possible depending
on whether one can characterize mathematically, or at least include in a
mathematical description, all the apparent possibilities. This is because
generally we know of no mathematical characterization of all the possible
real world referents of a given clearly meaningful natural language sentence.
We illustrate this point with (i), perhaps the oldest impossibility claim.
How do we characterize all possible straight edge/compass constructions
so we may prove, say, it is a logical contradiction if any one of them can be
used to trisect an arbitrary angle. Indeed, from the standard impossibility
proof as obtained from Galois theory, that is not possible even for some
specific angles θ, say θ = pi/6. On the other hand, it is well-known that such
construction is possible if the straight edge is marked, or if · · ·, and so on.
A simple such construction is given by Archimedes [1], the greatest ancient
Greek mathematician according to many, which works as illustrated in Fig. 1.
How does one exclude it in the description “compass and unmarked straight
edge”?
Given a compass, I contend that there is no need to mark a straight edge
in order to get an effectively marked one as follows. One sets the basic unit
measure with the compass, e.g., from AB of Fig. 1, and then flips it along the
straight edge to get any integer multiple. For the Archimedean construction,
one could slide the compass pointer along the straight line AC and see when
the pencil would cut the circle. I do not wish to go into Zeno’s paradoxes
here, but the above seems to be a real world construction one can carry out
with a compass and straight edge.
Of course such operations are not allowed in the intended description of
“compass and unmarked straight edge”. A much less misleading description
of the allowed operations can be given in this case with a more precise spec-
ification — indeed a perfectly precise one is given algebraically which is to
be translated to the “compass and straight edge” language in some way. My
point here is that the algebraic restriction is precise but the corresponding
“compass and straight edge” description is not, certainly not for their possi-
ble operations in the real world. There are manifold problems for such precise
translation, which I think lie at the foundation of much human knowledge
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with little known results.
My conclusion on this case (i) is that there is no mathematical charac-
terization of all possible “compass and unmarked straight edge” operations
in the real world. The impossibility proof works for a very specific subset of
such operations which are taken, perhaps appropriately when described in
sufficient detail, to correspond exactly to a set of algebraic operations.
The significance and difficulty of characterizing all possible real world
operations, even just in classical physics, is illustrated by case (ii). It is
taken to be an empirical fact that a Turing machine, or any of its equivalents
such as a Post machine, can simulate any mechanical procedure. The claim
is rightly called a thesis, not a theorem, not only because it is unproven, but
because one cannot have a theorem on something in the real world – in this
case, a mechanical procedure – which does not correspond to a primitive of
the mathematical system and also has no mathematical definition in terms
of the primitives.
This lack of a mathematical definition for “mechanical procedure” does
not prevent the thesis from being meaningful in the real world as long as
one can recognize some, maybe a lot – but all is not required – procedures
to be mechanical. However, it may be remarked that Zeno’s paradoxes and
corresponding “infinite machines” [2] can be construed as contrary claims to
the Church-Turing thesis, precisely because “mechanical procedure” is not a
precisely characterized concept.
Case (iii) on von Neumann’s No-Hidden Variable Theorem [3] provides a
clear illustration of the problem of how one may characterize mathematically
all systems or processes of a certain kind, in this case a “hidden-variable
theory”. I would not discuss here the now well known suspension of von
Neumann’s fifth linearity requirement of a hidden variable theory, which is
deemed unnecessary for both local and nonlocal such theories. A deeper
problem still exists on what one means by a “local theory”, which is exem-
plified by the recent controversy on the non-existence of local hidden-variable
theory supposedly given by the “Bell Theorem” [4].
The No-Clone Theorem of case (iv) is indeed a theorem concerning all
processes described by quantum physics, because all such processes can be in-
cluded in a proper mathematical representation. The usual proof [5] contains
the basic ingredients of a complete proof that can be spelled out readily.
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3 Quantum Bit Commitment
For the rest of this article I will talk about case (v) on QBC. At best a general
QBC impossibility claim would have the status of a thesis as in case (ii) for
Turing machines as Ozawa emphasized, for the similar reason that no one
knows the mathematical characterization of all QBC protocols, or indeed of
all protocols of any kind, classical or quantum. As in the case of a mechanical
procedure, one can typically recognize a QBC protocol when presented one
although one cannot include them all in a mathematical formulation.
In this connection, it may be observed that it is possible to characterize all
attacks on a given protocol of any kind, although that is already a somewhat
subtle issue – the relation between reality and its mathematical representa-
tion is almost always a subtle issue from the vantage point of present human
knowledge. Note also that if there is a problem of characterizing all attacks
on a protocol, it would not be possible to give unconditional security proofs
such as those claimed for quantum key distribution.
Despite this, it is widely accepted that there is a universal impossibility
proof on secure QBC since 1997 [6, 7], and the recent paper [8] adds to
this impression despite its ambivalence on this point. The implicit claim
has always been that all possible QBC protocols have been included in the
mathematical formulation of the problem given in the paper. The fact that
new features were introduced that were not covered in previous formulations
has always been ignored, as long as the feature has not led to a widely
accepted secure protocol which is the case thus far. The general impossibility
claim is repeated with the insistence that there is a proof for it.
There have been contrary claims from time to time appearing in the
quant-ph archive that secure QBC is possible with specific protocols and se-
curity proof sketches. Unfortunately, it is notoriously difficult to understand
someone else’s QBC protocol and security proof. Thus, I confine myself in
the following to only the new features I myself introduced in protocols of
various sorts that have not been covered in previous impossibility proofs.
The discussion would be just in words and hopefully understandable to any-
one somewhat knowledgeable on the issue as in cases (i)-(iv) above. The
intention is to lay out the issues in a way that preliminary assessment can
be made without going into technical details.
It is important to re-emphasize that there are two distinct issues here.
One is whether there is a universal impossibility proof and the other is
whether there is a QBC protocol that has been proved secure. The very
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fact that some features were not covered in previous proofs shows that there
was no valid basis to claim the existence of a universal impossibility proof,
regardless of whether any secure protocol has been found. In the following,
I will discuss a specific new feature not covered in any of the impossibility
proofs and which leads to secure protocols.
Broadly speaking, I have given three different new ways to obtain a pos-
sibly secure protocol since 2000 at the QCMC in Capri, Italy. At least two
of these were not covered by any impossibility proof known to anyone at the
time they were first discussed, in print or in saying. They are:-
(1) Use of Anonymous States:
A party uses classical random numbers in the protocol not known to the
other party.
(2) Action from B to Prevent Entanglement Cheating from A:
The idea is for B to destroy A’s (cheating) entanglement by A’s action.
(3) Testing before Commitment or Opening:
The idea is to destroy A or B’s own (cheating) entanglement by demand-
ing answers which force measurement on his/her own ancilla.
In case (1) with anonymous states, much initial reaction was that the
classical randomness can be purified quantum mechanically and the result-
ing pure state is assumed openly known. This is clearly not a realistic as-
sumption, and does not obtain under what I call the Secrecy Principle [9] for
QBC protocols: Whatever a party does is not required to be revealed to the
other party if it does not permit the first party to cheat. Clearly, such use of
classical random numbers must be allowed as it is in QKD protocols. It has
nothing to do with Kerckhoffs’ principle as alleged in [8]. In this connection,
it may be noted that something must be kept private in any kind of secure
protocol. In the QBC case, it is not realistic to assume that a party knows
the randomness purification basis of the other party. A theorem based on
such an assumption has no real world application.
It turns out it appears impossible to get a secure protocol this way. For
perfect concealing, a general proof of this impossibility was given in [10]
for a two-round protocol. A different argument applicable to multi-round
protocols was given by Ozawa [11] and later by Cheung [12]. For approximate
concealing, a simple proof covering all natural protocols was given by me in a
slide prepared for the 2005 QIT meeting in Sendai, Japan. More complicated
versions are also given in [8] and [13].
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In situation (2), the general futility of B’s action follows from the simple
commutativity of A and B’s actions when there is no checking intervention
in between. While it can reasonably be maintained that such possibility
is implicitly covered by the known impossibility proofs due to its technical
simplicity, it is conceptually far from trivial and should be indicated in a
general impossibility proof, especially one that goes not by deriving a general
contradiction but by examining each party’s possible actions.
In this connection, it may be observed there was really no place where one
can find a systematic QBC impossibility proof in the literature other than
vague generalities, till the appearance of [8]. This is indicative of the state
of the field. Unfortunately, the formulation and proof in [8] is not given or
translated into the usual language, and thus is very difficult to understand
and to assess. It is not even clear whether a universal impossibility proof is
claimed.
The testing possibilities for case (3) are clearly legitimate protocol el-
ements – similar ones are used in QKD protocols. They were simply not
covered in the impossibility proofs, not completely even in [8]. It was found
that entanglement cheating may be retained for some such proposed proto-
cols via proper Lu¨ders measurement on part of the ancilla. Indeed, it turns
out that if a party has the choice of many possible entanglements that yield
the same mixed result for the other party, such as a full permutation en-
tanglement for an unknown bit position, there is no known way to create a
secure protocol this way. On the other hand, if the party is limited to use a
specific entanglement, it can be destroyed by his/her own measurement upon
answering truthfully to questions. This possibility is explicitly described in
[14] as my protocol QBC3. It works in a similar way in a different setting as
my protocol QBC1 [15].
How does one party know a specific entanglement has actually been car-
ried out instead of some other action by the other party? In the QBC litera-
ture, the claim has always been that even under honest entanglement with all
classical randomness purified, no protocol can be secure [16, 17]. Such claim
is made without allowance for checking. There was no discussion on even
what would happen if one is caught cheating during protocol execution. The
usual implicit assumption is that there is no need for anyone to cheat during
testing. Nevertheless, it is important to note that whether a party is using
the prescribed entanglement can indeed be checked before commitment in
many protocols including my QBC1 and QBC3. In contrast, this cannot be
accomplished in a single-pass protocol to prevent A’s entanglement cheating.
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Intuitively, a party’s entanglement cheating possibility may be destroyed
when he/she has to measure on his/her ancilla to provide correct answers
during testing. If the entanglement is sparse, the measurement would totally
disentangle the corresponding bit sequence but it still appears mixed to the
other party in the form of classical randomness with no quantum purification.
The situation is similar to the case of one-pass protocols in which A picks
a state randomly without actual entanglement. The protocol is concealing
but A cannot cheat anyway. On the other hand, there can be no checking
in one-pass protocols so A cannot be assumed to be “honest” and thus not
entangle the choices.
This subtle possibility in my QBC1 and QBC3 was overlooked. The mul-
tiple possible entanglements all work the same if there is no testing later. In
fact, the one with minimal ancilla dimension is suggested in [8]. Thus, what
is missed in [8] is the possibility that a specific entanglement is dictated by
the protocol which upon testing can be destroyed to prevent further cheating.
The situation here is in a way similar to case (i) on angle trisection in the
difficulty of covering all real world possibilities. It is similar to case (iii) on
no hidden-variables in that only a specific formulation is covered that does
not exhaust all possible QBC protocols one can construct.
It may be pointed out that one cannot dismiss the above secure possibility
by claiming there is no (approximate) concealing proof for protocols QBC1
and QBC3. There is. But even if there is none, the possibility is not covered
by known impossibility proofs because such multiple entanglement possibility
for the same classical randomness is not or has not been related to concealing.
Here is an example of the two distinct issues mentioned above.
4 Conclusion
Secure bit commmitment is an extraordinarily useful tool that may be used to
perform many tasks. The area of quantum information would be enormously
enriched if QBC is included in its development. Note that the entanglement
cheating needed against a QBC protocol is not even on the experimental hori-
zon and may never be. Indeed, many QBC protocols are more practically
secure than any known QKD protocol and proper quantitative security com-
parison between them deserves to be made. That fully secure QBC protocols
cannot be obtained as claimed by the QBC impossibility proofs constitutes
a sociological and psychological barrier to the development of QBC. It is a
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difficult task to overcome this widely held perception, which I hope to begin
with this paper. One should be able to tell, independently of my own specific
protocols, that secure quantum bit commitment is far from a settled issue.
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6 Archimedes’s Trisection of an Arbitrary An-
gle
In Fig. 1, let AOB be a given angle. Construct a circle with O as center and
any length as radius. Construct a line through B intersecting diameter AC
extended so that ED is equal to the radius AO. The angle CDE is one third
of angle AOB.
10
Figure 1: Archimedes’s trisection of an arbitrary angle
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